Outlook for 2026: faster growth, lower inflation

26.11.2025

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A quick peek into 2026

The „Goldilocks" scenario

A relaxed bear, eyeing porridge at the perfect temperature with appetite, suggests that the economy will look very similar. This is a direct reference to the English term „goldilocks economy": growth will accelerate, and inflation will fall.

Global Economy: USA, China, and the Eurozone

We do not expect a recession in the USA. The Fed still has room for rate cuts (we expect two more, 2x25), and fiscal policy could be a positive surprise. In the Eurozone, we see a slow recovery driven cyclically by lower interest rates. ECB is done with easing but the risk is skewed towards more rate cuts on the basis of (very) low inflation. China remains a "black box," but its goal is clear: reduce overinvestment and support consumers. It is not going to happen overnight. The proces will be ongoing for years to come, not quarters. China will neither significantly boost nor slow down the global economy in 2026. However, it will be a source of cheap goods, which supports low inflation in Europe and Poland.

Main risk: an exceptional coupling of global investments with the U.S. tech sector. This drives both the cycle and valuations, but a potential bubble burst could derail it abruptly.

Geopolitics and commodities

We look at 2026 with cautious optimism.

Oil: Oversupply and closer U.S.–Saudi relations limit the risk of price spikes.

Middle East: We believe the peak of tension has been defused. 2026 will be dominated by trials to sanction new regime (treaties, talks, aliances).

Ukraine: Pressure to end the war is growing. An interesting scenario is Turkey's possible role as a security guarantor. Resuming official commodity supply from Russia would be another positive (disinflationary) price shock.

Poland: acceleration and low rates

Polish economy will accelerate from 3.6% in 2025 to 4.2% in 2026, driven by accumulated investments, strong consumption, and export recovery. This is a bolder forecast than the market (3.7-3.8%), though unchanged since September. Similarly bold are our inflation forecasts: average price growth will fall to 2.3% (consensus around 2.7–3.0%). Interest rates will be reduced to 3% (consensus 3.5%). Our forecast revision stems from low food and fuel prices and the absence of wage pressure, even amidst spot bursts of investment activity. We assume rate cuts will be rather cautious in next months (2x25bp) accelerate in the second half of the year (3x25bp).

What about fiscal policy? Although spending is high, it is largely import-oriented (defense) and not as inflationary as it seems. The risk lies in the election year and the temptation to stimulate consumption. It is doubtful if any actions will be taken before the result of 2027 elections. If so, impementation is a game for 2028 what makes this only a risk factor, not a major point of baseline scenario.

2025 scenario: an assessment

Growth

USA: The expected 2% growth turned out to be almost identical to the results recorded in the first half of the year. Unfortunately, the government shutdown will exacerbate the slowdown, as the number of data releases has decreased significantly. The good results from the first half of the year were partly due to stockpiling before the introduction of tariffs, so the second half will be weaker.

EMU: Growth of 0.9% was too low. The result for the third quarter is 1.4%. Economic indicators show a slow improvement. On the fiscal side, an expansionary policy continued, which may have been indirectly influenced by Trump's policies.

Poland: Growth in the first three quarters was 3.4%. However, our full-year forecast of 3.8% is likely to be overestimated, with the actual value closer to 3.6–3.7%. The high growth in consumption was an unexpected positive. The relatively low (and highly volatile) growth in investment came as a negative surprise.

Inflation

USA: Easing price pressures have been disrupted by the trade war (Donald Trump's decisiveness in imposing tariffs has exceeded our expectations). The effects of tariffs are filtering through slowly but are visible and persistent due to stockpiling.

EMU: Inflation returns to target as wage growth slows. The tariff shock has had a disinflationary effect on the eurozone.

Poland: The inflation trajectory was correct. The effects of the change in the inflation basket were exceptionally large, with the entire inflation path shifting significantly downwards. Following this adjustment, the inflation levels set at the beginning of the year proved accurate, both in terms of core inflation and general inflation.

Job market

USA: Cooling labor market (decline in labor demand, slight increase in unemployment rate and slowdown in wage growth). However, the slowdown in employment growth is also due to lower labor supply growth. It's a delicate balance.

EMU: Wage growth has slowed in recent months. Leading indicators suggest that this trend will continue. Employment growth remains relatively low by historical standards.

Poland: The labor market has cooled. Employment has fallen slightly. Lower demand for labor has been met with lower supply. The unemployment rate has risen slightly in official figures due to regulatory changes. At the time of writing, wages in the enterprise sector had slowed to an average of 7%, while wages in the national economy remained at an average of ~8%. Downward trajectory.

Interest rates and currency exchange rates

USA: We predicted that the Fed would not be overly concerned about inflation caused by customs effects. This was a mistake, as it acted in accordance with forward guidance, delaying further cuts. Interestingly, however, if the Fed decides on one more cut in December (25 basis points), the expected interest rate level will be in line with our forecast.

EMU: As expected, the ECB cut rates relatively quickly, reaching the forecasted deposit rate of 2% by the middle of the year. The chances of further interest rate adjustments this year are low, but not zero.

Poland: We assumed an aggressive scenario of interest rate cuts, which, instead of beginning in March, started in May (with a cut of 50 basis points!). It is now December, and it looks like the year will end only 25 basis points above our forecast. The MPC's forward guidance has caused more confusion than clarity, and the MPC has moved in line with realized inflation forecasts. Unfortunately, we were misled along the way.

Legend: hits, misses, reports.

Section 1:
Real economy

USA: without recession, tariffs echoes will maintain slightly higher inflation

PIT revenues are steadily rising, which is inconsistent with a 'weak' labor market



There has been a moderate change in the unemployment rate (7 months after the cyclical low)



Equilibrium in the labor market at a lower level



Theory versus reality in tariff policy



The US economy has experienced significant turbulence, largely due to the president's tariff policy and ongoing tensions in Congress. The government shutdown, the longest in history, ended after 43 days. However, another shutdown is looming in early 2026. Although, setting aside the volatility, **the outlook is not bad**. Monetary (fiscal) policy came to the rescue.

The labor market is characterized by lower growth rates. However, unlike in previous cycles, this does not translate into faster increases in the unemployment rate. It is estimated that the reduction in the number of migrants (a slower influx and deportations) has resulted in a lower employment change consistent with stabilizing the unemployment rate at 30,000–40,000. Interestingly, despite the media hype surrounding large changes in job creation, the slowdown is not visible in budget revenues. For example, an upward trend has dominated PIT tax revenues in recent months. Purchasing power remains strong. **Given these conditions, it is difficult to consider the labor market a reliable harbinger of an impending recession.**

The inflationary impact of tariffs may persist through most of 2026, by which time the increased costs will have been passed on to consumers. However, tariff revenues imply a lower rate than announced for now. The administration's latest proposal, the so-called "tariff dividend", would provide tax-paying Americans (excluding the highest earners) with up to USD 2,000. This would stimulate consumption by 0.5%-1.0% of GDP. However, distributing these funds through methods other than direct cash transfers may limit their positive impact on inflation.

The Fed is effectively balancing risks to the labor market and inflation, thereby stabilizing the economy. In summary, we forecast a scenario in which the U.S. economy neither grows too quickly nor falls into a recession. **We predict GDP growth of 2.2%, compared to the consensus estimate of 1.8%.**

Eurozone: towards a cyclical recovery without inflation

Regardless of the measure (year-on-year), wages are slowing down



No boom, but upwards!



Credit is increasing steadily and consistently



Fiscal room paves the way to higher investment. It will take time, though.



GDP growth has remained sluggish in recent quarters. The situation was even worse in the German economy. **However, the outlook is now brighter.** Inflation has been brought under control, and leading indicators suggest that wage pressure will continue cooling to pre-pandemic levels. There is no need for the economy to cool further. Interest rate cuts implemented thus far coincide with a slow acceleration in lending. Typical delays suggest further progress in this area.

Economic indicators are improving. Expectations for the German economy and the eurozone are the highest they have been since before the war in Ukraine began. **In our opinion, the combination of improved sentiment and a revival in lending implies a cyclical economic recovery over the next year.** In addition to cyclical issues, certain structural changes are also worth noting. These include new fiscal packages, the loosening of budget rules, and the postponement of the implementation of ETS2. Although it is very difficult to quantify the impact of additional spending on the economy and determine when this spending will have a stronger impact on growth, we expect the first implications for GDP growth to be visible in 2026.

For this reason, we see opportunities for GDP growth above the consensus estimate (1.4% vs. 1%). We also feel obliged to mention that sentiment regarding the overall competitiveness of the economy often moves in tandem with the cycle. While last year saw many reasons for complaint, which could have further hindered the cyclical recovery, the current improvement in the outlook may generate positive feedback effects.

China: repairing domestic demand will take years

China invests more than other Asian countries (investment rate)



**0 denotes the peak in a given country.*

Consumer sentiment still running (very) low



Chinese exports don't slow down, but change direction (bln USD)



Record investment inefficiency



The expected growth of China's GDP is a political choice. **It is expected to reach 4.5% next year.** The government will provide details on this in March of next year. At that time, the report on the meeting concerning the five-year economic plan will also be published. As of now, we only know that China intends to continue increasing domestic demand.

The authorities know that increasing the investment rate will not achieve this. The investment rate is already very high, both compared to other developed countries and compared to Asian countries during their investment boom. Excessive investment results in declining efficiency, a trend we have seen since the financial crisis. Declining efficiency means excess capital, especially productive capital. **Over time, an effective reduction in the investment rate should reduce excess production capacity. However, given the fragile financial balance of the Chinese economy, which has been fragile for years, nothing more than cautious and gradual measures can be considered.**

For years, there has been talk of increasing consumption, which is significantly below the level seen in similarly developed countries. Low consumption equals a high savings rate, which equals high investment. Unlike in a strictly market-based economy, the government can largely control the investment rate. A decline in the investment rate should allow for a decline in the savings rate and potentially increase the share of consumption in GDP. **To be more confident in achieving this goal, consumer sentiment must improve. This can be done by halting the decline in real estate prices and expanding the social security system, for example. This process will likely take years. Combined with a large surplus of production capacity, this does not bode well for rapid inflation.**

We expect China's exports to continue shifting away from the US and toward other countries, mainly in Asia, the UAE, and Brazil. This process appears to have much greater potential than we originally thought.

Poland: in anticipation of (delayed) investment boom

Disbursements from Recovery Fund to speed up notably (our simplified estimates, % of GDP)



The peak of signed co-financing agreements under Cohesion Policy, 12-month sum, bln PLN



Disbursements from Cohesion Policy gather pace, 12-month sum, bln EUR



Vertical lines denote 3 years after a new multiannual financial framework began.

This investment cycle will be different (100=local minimum)



Investments were expected to be a highlight of the 2025 economy. Unfortunately, this was not the case, and the entire investment cycle was delayed. Experts primarily point to delays between fund allocators and contractors as the cause. However, our feedback from customers and company comments suggest that there has been a significant improvement in this area. The last few quarters of investment have also seen high volatility, which we associate with accounting for defense-related expenditures.

We continue to expect a significant positive impact from EU spending. However, in the case of the National Recovery Plan, there is little time left to use the funds. For the grant part, the funds must be allocated by the end of 2026. For the loan part, loan agreements must be signed by that date, though disbursement may occur after. Assuming the government does not want to squander the Recovery Fund, we expect to see a significant inflow of money from this source in 2026. Our very rough estimates of this inflow are presented on the left. We assume full utilization, so the scale of the impact on GDP is overestimated. This is because it only compares volumes without making assumptions about the value of the multiplier. In the short term, this value will be lower than 1 because of imports.

In terms of the standard expenditure perspective under cohesion policy, the picture is looking increasingly better. However, it is clear that there is been a delay in using funds in this area, too. A systematic improvement has only become apparent since the beginning of 2025. **We anticipate a significant acceleration in the utilization of these EU funds in the coming years.** There has been a change in the settlement rule from "n+3" to "n+2." This means that, after the current budget period ends in 2027, all projects must be settled within two years rather than three, as was the case in previous EU budgets.

Due to the expected increase in spending under the Recovery Fund and the simultaneous influx of cohesion funds, we anticipate a significant acceleration in investment growth in the upcoming quarters. **Consequently, the current investment cycle may follow a steeper trajectory, particularly in its initial phase. Spending will peak in terms of growth in 2026. Investments will reach 9.3% in 2026 (consensus: 8%).**

Poland: labor market still weak, a continued slowdown in wage growth

Stronger GDP growth will support a (modest) rebound in employment



Horizontal axis: GDP (t-1, % y/y, SA); vertical axis: employment in the national economy (% y/y). Years 2010–2019 and 2023–2025, excluding the atypical period 2020–2022.

Wage pressure is fading in services and industry, as clearly shown by SAAR measures



Wage reshuffling across sectors: By how many percent is the wage higher/lower compared to the national average?



NBP surveys show that companies feel weaker wage pressure and a slight improvement in employment prospects (SA)



The labor market remains stable, while wage growth continues to slow. Currently, it faces two main forces. On the one hand, demographics are relentlessly pulling workers out of the labor force. An additional constant risk here is the potential outflow of Ukrainian workers if the situation on the front stabilizes (we dedicated a separate slide to this). On the other hand, faster GDP growth driven by investments and strong consumption should increase demand for labor. Such a combination typically raises concerns about renewed wage pressure. However, current signals from the labor market do not indicate this, even as the economy continues to accelerate.

Business cycle indicators suggest wage pressure is stabilizing slightly above its historical equilibrium. Companies still report only modest demand for labor despite GDP growth of 3.7% (Q3). The vacancy-to-employment ratio has returned to pre-pandemic levels. **Survey data point to a (slight) rebound in manufacturing, construction, and the HoReCa sector. This is not enough to reverse the downward trend in wage dynamics, which we discuss in detail on the next slide. In our view, wage growth will slow to an average of 6.5% in 2026 (with year-end values possibly below 6%). A small increase in the minimum wage (3.5%) and lower inflation will help.**

It took time, but wages in the services sector have finally surpassed the national average. Meanwhile, manufacturing and construction have lost significance. Improvements in the euro area and the investment impulse will provide more support for labor demand in manufacturing and construction. Automation and AI effects remain anecdotal for now, though we believe they could sharply (and additionally) reduce labor demand at some point (1–3 year horizon). This will mainly affect wages in the services sector. Changes in wage relations will occur alongside lower overall wage dynamics across the economy.

Poland: investments alone are not enough to stop the fading wage dynamics

(Observed) employment in construction is less dependent on current sector activity



Horizontal axis: value added in construction (t-1, % y/y, SA); vertical axis: employment (construction) in the national economy (% y/y). Years 2010–2025.

Demand for construction workers is waiting for an acceleration in investment implementation (SA)



**the job vacancy and expected employment indicators are standardized by their average level and volatility for the years 2010–2025.*

Infrastructure construction benefits the most from EU funds (SA)



Wage cycles are synchronized. There is a dependence on EU funds, but it is not very strong



The implementation of investments financed by Cohesion Funds and the National Recovery Plan will rely heavily on the infrastructure construction sector (as usual) and on specialized works (a new element). The combined effects will also spill over to industrial companies supplying materials necessary for these projects.

During the last two EU programming periods, the investment cycle altered the wage structure within construction – wages grew faster in companies executing infrastructure projects. **However, the direct impact of construction on wages across the entire economy is limited.** Construction accounts for about 4–5% of total employment, with the infrastructure segment representing only 1–2%. This means that even a 10 pp additional wage increase in infrastructure firms (e.g., from 7% to 17% – a scenario closer to *fiction* than *science*) would raise overall enterprise sector wage growth by only about 0.2 pp. Our forecast for 2026 is 6.5%; such a modification would lift it to 6.7%. It should also be noted that GUS statistics on infrastructure construction may lack precision – they cover only employment contracts, while a large share of workers operate under lump-sum arrangements.

Estimating the spillover of investments on wage growth outside construction is more difficult. Historically, stronger wage growth in infrastructure construction coincided with improvements in manufacturing and the broader enterprise sector. The causality: EU funds → construction → the rest is not particularly strong. This year's impulse may be stronger due to the record amount of incoming EU funds and the need for accelerated implementation of National Recovery Plan investments. On the other hand, the economy has spare production capacity, and the GDP growth trend has weakened (a cyclical recovery at a lower trend is different from one at a higher trend). Similarly, wages are still seeking a cyclical bottom. Labor demand remains relatively low – stronger wage pressure may appear when GDP grows at 5–6%. Currently, such forecasts are absent.

The acceleration of the investment cycle will slow the decline in wage dynamics but will not reverse the trend. Wages are crucial for inflation, but other processes will dominate inflation in 2026 (read more here).

Poland: consumption as a stable growth driver in 2026

Consumption will grow proportionally to the improvement in household income



...and currently, consumers prefer to save less rather than postpone purchases.



Convergence will be more pronounced in services.



The savings rate is historically high...



We expect a slight slowdown in private consumption growth, from around 4% in 2025 to 3.6% in 2026. Breaking down contributions between goods and services is not straightforward. Services remain supported by stability and long-term trends. Poles are still catching up on spending for organized tourism and HoReCa, making a sharp decline in service growth—from about 6% to below 4–5%—unlikely.

For goods, the trend is moving in the opposite direction. Business surveys point to fewer households planning to buy cars or renovate homes, which signals weaker demand for durable goods. On the other hand, the expanding mortgage and consumer loan markets could provide some support, although this link appears more theoretical than empirical.

Consumption will be sustained by lower propensity to save and still relatively strong wage growth. In 2024, Eurostat estimated the savings rate at 7.1%, one of the highest in Europe (even accounting for survey limitations), driven by rebuilding savings after the inflation shock. This trend strengthened in 2025. By mid-year, the savings rate reached 9.7%, the highest level since EU accession (excluding lockdown episodes), although it was already less spectacular compared to Europe. We believe, however, that continuation of this upward trend is unlikely – deposit volumes suggest no gap versus trend, and recent consumer confidence surveys show a deeper decline in expectations for future savings than in willingness to make major purchases.

For real wages, two opposing forces will interact. On one hand, a slowdown in nominal wage growth (see labor market section – link), and on the other, lower inflation (see inflation section – link). As a result, real wage growth may be only slightly below 2025 levels (slowdown from 5% to around 4%).

Poland: foreign trade balance in positive territory in 2026

The current pace of export growth is too low.

Poland is rapidly expanding exports to the south, and in 2026 the euro area will join as well



Exports to individual countries, January–August 2025 (%YoY)

Risk: Central banks' import projections for trading partners are pessimistic



Index based on central bank projections, covering forecasts for the six largest trading partners (accounting for 50% of exports).

We expect the coming year to bring stronger export growth. Exports of goods and services in national accounts grew at 2.0–2.5% y/y during the first half of 2025. This is twice as slow as the average pace observed over the past 15 years (6.5%). A detailed breakdown of the data shows that the main drag comes from exports to Western European countries (France, Germany), while growth markets are primarily our closest neighbors to the east and south (Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary) and to the north (Sweden).We expect next year to bring higher-than-forecast growth in Germany, which will naturally boost Poland's export performance. Overall, exports are projected to grow at around 6%. Currently, exports are operating well below potential.

Exports and imports are expected to remain broadly balanced, mainly in terms of capital and intermediate goods. The year 2026 will bring an acceleration in investment, with overall growth expected to increase by more than 5 percentage points compared to the current year. Based on the Oxford Economics model, we estimate that such a change should raise import volumes by about 1 percentage point. At the same time, we expect rather moderate changes in consumption dynamics – growth will be slightly slower than in 2025. In this case, for every percentage point less in consumption growth, import growth is reduced by about 0.6 percentage points. Overall, domestic demand should add around 0.4–0.5 percentage points to import volumes, with foreign demand linked to exports contributing roughly the same. This means an acceleration from the current 3.5–4% to around 5–6% next year.

Economic outlook suggests a small current account deficit. After Q3 2025, Poland recorded a deficit of around 1.5% of GDP. Next year should bring an improvement up to 0.5 percentage points. The main factor behind this improvement will be a better goods balance, driven by higher exports (both real and nominal) and nominally weaker import growth due to cheaper raw materials (oil, metals) and slowly rising prices of industrial goods (global PPI indices).The surplus in services will likely remain stable – further improvement would require a strong increase in ICT service exports, which seems unlikely. Overall, the deficit will be small compared to historical levels – similar to that seen in 2019.

GDP to grow by 4.2% in 2026



Risks (+) rather in the background

- A larger scale of fiscal expansion directed more toward social spending or other types of expenditures with higher multipliers than defense spending (a political campaign could begin in 2026)
- Underestimation of the actual scale of payments under agreements financed through the EU funds (i.e., what will be recorded by Statistics Poland).
- Even faster consumption growth (inflation perception effect)

Risks (-) dominate

- Incomplete utilization of funds under the National Recovery Plan (primarily the grant component, which must be spent by the end of next year).
- Lack of recovery in foreign demand (failure to meet expectations for an acceleration in GDP growth in the German economy)
- Continued accumulation of household savings, which, combined with slower income growth, may result in weaker consumption.
- End of war in Ukraine (details in the following slide).

Risks associated with ending the war in Ukraine

The outflow of migrants from Poland will hit GDP…



…it will also be pro-inflationary.



It implies a higher equilibrium level for interest rates.



Idiosyncratic risks in Poland:

1. (+) Improved investor and consumer sentiment, along with changes in government spending. In our view, these effects are difficult to quantify due to the limited representation of such variables in the models we use. We should treat this as an upward risk for GDP growth and inflation.
2. (+) Actual reconstruction of Ukraine with the involvement of Polish companies providing labor, capital, and materials. First, we believe this is a risk that extends well beyond 2026, as the preparation phase alone will take months. Second, repeated attempts to push Ukraine toward a peace treaty, combined with Russia's stronger negotiating position and Turkey's growing interest in the process (acting as a peace broker and strengthening ties with both Ukraine and the U.S.), suggest that these three countries will dominate reconstruction efforts. This is even more likely given the high probability that, following a treaty, the most devastated territories will end up under Russian control. This factor is difficult to quantify, similar to point (1).
3. (-) Outflow of Ukrainian Workers from Poland (the effect of war ending and family reunification) is – for a change – quite well quantifiable. For the analysis, we assumed that around 500,000 Ukrainian workers would leave Poland overnight (a truly severe scenario). The simulation was based on the Oxford Economics (OE) econometric model, using our forecasts as the baseline scenario. We examined the impact of this wave of departures on Poland's GDP, inflation, and interest rates. **The biggest losses from the outflow of workers will be seen in GDP.** The model suggests a GDP decline of about 0.8 percentage points in 2026. However, the weakening would not be purely short-term. The model indicates that in the longer term (2027–2030), growth would be on average 0.2 percentage points lower. **The outflow of workers will have a lasting pro-inflationary effect.** Estimates based on the OE model suggest that inflation would rise by 0.5–0.6 percentage points annually. This means that instead of fluctuating near the NBP's inflation target (2.5%), we would systematically exceed 3%. Higher inflation forces a slight adjustment in NBP policy – the impact of rising inflation outweighs GDP losses. The decline is strictly supply-driven, while higher inflation in the longer term reflects stronger wage pressures in the economy. Therefore, **the Monetary Policy Council would maintain higher interest rates.** The OE model suggests, however, that the increase would be moderate – 0.25–0.5 percentage points above our baseline scenario. **Currently, we assume that rates will ultimately reach 3%. With a larger outflow of workers, this would rise to 3.25–3.50%.**

Global risks:

It is highly doubtful that ending the war will lead to a lower military spending. Quite the opposite – defense spending tends to capture collective imagination and offers significant benefits, including efforts to strengthen the common market in Europe. We will not elaborate on the gains from yielding to Trump's demands – they are obvious. In our view, the most tangible and significant risk associated with ending the war is lower oil prices and Russia's official return to global markets. It is worth noting that, given the increasingly strong trade ties between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, this further reduces the risk of sudden supply cuts.

Section 2: Inflation and currency exchange rates

Global inflation to stay low (or lower)

Food. FAO price index should continue to decline. In 2026, we would target around a 2–3% decrease (in USD). Dairy products (oversupply) and sugar (oversupply) are expected to see price drops. Offsetting factors include meat prices (strong demand), possible stabilization of vegetable oils and grain prices (favorable supply outlook, although we have recently observed slight increases in fertilizer prices. Mercosur effects.

Gas and Crude Oil. Forecasts are dominated by price declines, primarily driven by high inventories in the U.S. and an excess of supply over demand. Easing tensions in the Middle East and a more likely de-escalation (or status quo) rather than escalation of Russia's aggression against Ukraine suggest downside risks here. *Anecdotal evidence:* European FSRU terminals are leaving European shores due to overestimated gas demand.

Freight. Stable, with the successful completion of the "northern route" test from China to Europe bypassing the Suez Canal (travel time cut by half, additional security in case of attacks in the Strait of Hormuz).

DRAM, NAND, CPUs. Recently increased prices due to U.S.–China tensions and reduced production of older memory chips outside China. The issue is rather sector-specific.

Tradable goods (durables, semi-durables). The maximum scenario is slight increases, mainly due to the elimination of extreme supply in the global economy caused by trade wars. There are no cost-based or demand-driven factors for more significant movements.

Oversupply in oil in 2026



Memory price increases rather sectoral than general problem (2022 unlikely)



Transport prices low/falling



Upside risks: sudden acceleration of the global economy, supply constraints related to trade wars, regulatory risks (see next slide).
Downside risks: end of the war in Ukraine, correction in U.S. tech stocks (= slowdown in investment spending).
We estimate that the risk distribution is asymmetric toward the realization of an inflation-friendly scenario.

The scary chart that it's probably time to put on the shelf

In 2022, we used this chart to illustrate where inflation risks were concentrated. It was perfectly suited for that purpose because the global economy had just experienced an energy shock (and was still in the midst of it), the war in Ukraine was raging with greater intensity, and we were living in a state of constant tension, navigating a geopolitical minefield. Inflation expectations were unanchored, and the economy was asymmetrically vulnerable to new shocks that could push inflation even higher.

The situation – instead of escalating – has drifted in the completely opposite direction. The war continues, but dependence on Russian raw materials has been significantly reduced. The conflict is spreading to other countries only in a hybrid sense. The energy transition is ongoing, but prices are falling rather than rising. Even the situation in the Middle East seems to be stabilizing. Currently, the global environment is disinflationary, as we described on the previous slide. Tariff shocks are nowhere near the scale of energy shocks and, moreover, they do not affect all regions equally (inflationary in the U.S., disinflationary in Poland and the EU).

There are no obvious factors that could once again push energy prices sky-high. The supply side also appears better aligned and more flexible. Consequently, there is little reason to treat a scenario of a shock-driven surge in energy prices as anything more than a highly unlikely curiosity.



Factors supporting why history is unlikely to repeat itself: **(1)** Real interest rates are higher (~1.5% vs ~0% previously). **(2)** "Sticky inflation" after the 2021–2022 inflation wave is clearly lower (currently ~3% vs 6–7% before). **(3)** No strong case for a repeat of an oil shock of similar scale thanks to shale supply (though low investment could lead to higher prices again in 2027/2028). **(4)** In the 1970s, oil prices never returned to lower levels (this time, however, we have seen a clear correction). **(5)** Fiscal deficits are now much higher (6–7% vs ~3%) – paradoxically, this creates a risk of a sudden need for downward adjustment, not upward.

Regulatory factors important in Europe and Poland

CBAM. CBAM is a tax on imports of carbon-intensive products into the EU. Initially, it will apply to six groups: steel, iron, aluminum, cement, fertilizers, hydrogen, and electricity. The mechanism aims to level the playing field between EU producers (covered by the ETS) and importers from outside the EU. Starting in 2026, importers will purchase CBAM certificates corresponding to the emissions generated during production. S&P notes that in the early stages, the tax will cover only a small share of goods, and free allowances will remain in the system. A stronger price increase due to this regulation is expected only around 2029 (if it occurs at all, depending on changes within the ETS itself).

ETS2. will cover fuels sold by distributors (e.g., gas stations), building heating with gas or heating oil, and small-scale industry not included in the current ETS. The pricing of certificates will differ from EUA in the main ETS1 system. By decision of the European Council, the implementation of ETS2 has been postponed until 2028. In the long term, however, it will remain a pro-inflationary factor. The Czech National Bank (CNB) estimated that full-scale implementation in 2027 would increase inflation by 0.6 percentage points, even with partial cost compensation (e.g. from the Social Climate Fund). For the euro area, ECB projections indicate an impact of 0.0–0.4 percentage points, while commercial research shows varying scenarios (e.g. ABN Amro +0,4 for Dutch Households, Capital Economics – 0,1 pkt for the euro area). In the shorter term, the ECB notes that national climate regulations will generate a smaller inflationary impulse than in previous years.

Unexpected domestic twist: Just a few weeks ago, it seemed that electricity prices for households would be only slightly higher than in 2025, mainly due to increases in capacity charges and distribution fees. However, the President's proposal on electricity prices received an unexpectedly positive response from experts, and the government appears to be considering internalizing at least part of these measures. We now see a greater chance that household electricity bills will increase in 01.2026 and then fall somewhere during the year.

Estimated price relationships – ETS vs. CBAM



Impact of domestic regulatory changes on HICP from ECB projections (12.2024)



President's proposal to reduce electricity prices: Project includes: (1) Elimination of: renewable energy, capacity, cogeneration, and transitional charges. (2) Reduction of distribution fees. (3) Limiting the costs of certificates related to green energy. (4) Changes to balancing system rules. Elements considered highly unlikely include a VAT reduction (due to a tight budget) and redirecting funds from ETS. Nevertheless, there is a speculation about lowering the WACC for energy trading companies.

Core inflation: v. gentle turnaround

Goods. Those subject to international trade (durable and semi-durable) account for about 13% of the inflation basket, which is relatively small. The starting point is negative dynamics (strong for durable goods, mild for semi-durable goods). We assume some reduction of oversupply generated by trade wars, but without a currency shock, strong increases are unlikely. We see no reason why technological progress should not lead to secular price declines.

Services. High inertia (when it slows down, it really slows down) suggests a continuation of downward trends. Halting the progress in wage reductions in 2026 is not enough to expect a shift toward horizontal or upward trends. 5% is more likely the maximum scenario.

Regulatory factors. Changes in excise tax will have a similar impact as last year if the president does not sign the new law and the previously established “roadmap” remains in force (+0.3 pp m/m to core inflation). Presidential signature = +0.6 pp m/m to core. The first option implies no changes in annual dynamics.

2026 avg 2.8%. Min 2.6% (IV), max 3.1% (XII)



Note: Graph presents ex post inflation i. e. after expected adjustments to monetary policy. Low/high paths are not confidence intervals in statistical meaning but visualisation of risks and their timing.

Core inflation path will take the shape of a flat “U”. Around the beginning of the year, we can expect lows, followed by slight increases. Uncertainty regarding the effects of excise duties does not change much. An average annual core inflation of 2.9% vs. 3.2% is not significant from the perspective of monetary policy. Considering the MPC’s greater acceptance of using the entire range of permissible inflation fluctuations around the target, whether core inflation contributes 1.5 pp or 1.7 pp to overall inflation does not matter.

CPI inflation slightly below NBP target. It will most likely be sustainable

Core inflation (in short) adds 1.5-1.7pp to CPI inflation. The rest falls on other factors.

Food prices. The coming months will be marked by further deceleration in annual dynamics. Negative values are even possible. A slight rebound at the end of the year will mainly be due to base effects. Agricultural markets will support low inflation in 2026. Mercosur effect.

Fuels. Instead of a flat trajectory, we assume slight declines (a total of 4% over the year). The demand-supply situation in the global market remains exceptionally favorable.

Energy. Price increases for consumers are essentially only possible through distribution, and on a small scale. Risks related to the tariff price for electricity and gas are skewed downward.

Basket change. Consumers are aggressively optimizing their purchases. We estimate that this could reduce inflation by as much as 0.2 percentage points. There are considerable risks due to COICOP18, although this is also an opportunity to better reflect cheaper substitutes.

Regulatory factors other than in core. The sugar tax has too little impact to warrant consideration of its effects.

CPI avg 2.3% in 2026. Min 2,2% (IV), Max 2,6% (VI).



Note: Graph presents ex post inflation i. e. after expected adjustments to monetary policy. Low/high paths are not confidence intervals in statistical meaning but visualisation of risks and their timing.

Risks up rather in the background: Faster increases in excise tax rates (requires presidential approval), weather anomalies (in our view, this factor is less important as there have been significant adjustments in agriculture in recent years), stronger effects of closing the output gap (second half of the year).

Dominant downside risks: Oil prices, food prices, inertia in service inflation (downward), persistent oversupply in China. Anchoring and imagination bias – after such high inflation, we keep looking for a return to the average.

Inflation components in 2026



61%: The lion's share of inflation according to the COICOP methodology is driven by food, fuel, and other energy sources (including in the "housing" category). Regardless of the business cycle phase, global movements of prices (not appying directly to energy sources in housing since they are to some extent state-administered) filter fast to local counterparts.

16%: The second largest category is non-labor-intensive services. Their costs are primarily driven by labor and secondly by capital and technology. Examples: finance, insurance, communication services, television, radio. Strong inertia, high dependence on the level of wages and energy.

10%: Labor-intensive services do not need to be explained. A factor determining their costs is labor (wages), even though the service provider is not necessarily sensitive to energy costs, they are often cited as reason for price increases (in the wider cost structure, this cost is minimal compared to labor itself). Strong inertia.

8%: Durable goods are sensitive to global inflation (typical tradables) and exchange rate. Typical oversupply, price cuts before the season. Dependence on the exchange rate. Currently, "Fast Fashion" and increasing automation potential for further price decreases. Stopping globalization is unlikely.

5%: Durable goods account for only a small part of inflation. Automation, technological progress and the increasing functionality of goods mean that prices in this category are subject to a long-term downward trend. Only major supply disruptions cause sharp upward jumps in prices.

The table below shows inflation by various sub-categories. Individual inflation elements. Our forecast at the end.

	Today	**Different "tomorrows"**										**Forecast**
G. Perishable	2.75	-3.00	-2.00	-1.00	0.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	6.00	**1.00**
G. Durable	-4.30	-8.00	-6.00	-4.00	-3.00	-2.00	-1.00	0.00	2.00	4.00	8.00	**4.00**
G. Semi-durable	-0.17	-2.00	0.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	6.00	7.00	8.00	**4.00**
S. labor intensive	5.70	3.00	3.50	4.00	4.50	5.00	5.50	6.00	6.50	7.00	7.50	**4.50**
S. Non labor intensive	5.99	3.00	3.50	4.00	4.50	5.00	5.50	6.00	6.50	7.00	7.50	**4.50**
CPI Inflation	**2.95**	**-1.66**	**-0.66**	**0.27**	**1.14**	**2.01**	**2.88**	**3.76**	**4.68**	**5.61**	**6.64**	**2.29**

The zloty on a slightly depreciating path

This year's EUR/PLN quotations can be divided into two periods.

The first, which lasted until around April, was characterized by high volatility, primarily due to the change in the stance of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) on future interest rates. **The second** period has basically lasted until now and, unlike the first, has shown minimal volatility. The situation was much simpler in the case of USD/PLN, where the pair recorded a clear decline over the year. This was, of course, the result of systematic increases in EUR/USD, which accelerated significantly following the announcement of changes to US tariff policy in the first quarter of the year.

For several reasons, we expect a moderate — though greater than the consensus — depreciation of the zloty against the euro. Firstly, we believe that the market is currently inadequately pricing the future path of interest rates. This has consequences for the development of **real interest rates, which are expected to decline in the coming quarters.** Secondly, we see **risks in fiscal policy**. Not only are we referring to the recent decisions by two rating agencies (Fitch and Moody's) to downgrade the country's credit rating outlook, but also to the friction between the president and the government regarding potential tax increases. In our opinion, **the election calendar** will also hinder fiscal consolidation (parliamentary elections are scheduled for autumn 2027). Furthermore, we are aware of the more pronounced wage growth in Poland compared to other EU countries. From the perspective of foreign investors, this could mean a **further decline in the domestic economy's competitiveness** in terms of wages, which would be offset by a weakening of the exchange rate.

Finally, the zloty is not so much overvalued as it is significantly deviating from its previous real effective exchange rate (REER) average. This clearly indicates where the risks lie. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the Ministry of Finance will have considerable scope to control the exchange rate in the event of a major attempt at depreciation (EU funds).



Section 3: Fiscal and monetary policy

Poland’s fiscal policy not so expansive as it might seem

Fiscal policy in Poland not so expansive...



Poland spends the most on defense among EU countries



Poland will lower its deficit in 2026 acc to EC



2026 budget bill aims for some budgetary savings, % of GDP



In recent years, fiscal policy has become one of the hottest topics. EU countries' budgets were initially put under pressure by the response to the pandemic, and subsequently by the impact from the war in Ukraine. It became evident that EU military spending needed a significant increase, with Poland – given its geographical location – responding most strongly to this call. **Consequently, we are already allocating almost 5% of GDP to military spending**, which negatively impacts the overall fiscal balance. However, **when we adjust the national fiscal position to account for the increase in military spending after 2022, it transpires that fiscal policy is not as expansionary as it might appear.** Why is this adjustment necessary? This is to show the specific composition of this expenditure, most of which is imports, and how the current 2% affects domestic demand. Defense spending multipliers are currently low, which does not result in a significant increase in GDP or inflationary pressures.

What about fiscal consolidation? Given the latest EC forecast and the draft budget bill for next year, it is difficult to expect a significant reduction in the deficit in the next year or two. According to the EC, **Poland will reduce its deficit by 0.5% of GDP next year**. The same source states **that Poland will have the highest deficit in the EU next year**, at 6.3% of GDP. However, **we are not particularly concerned about this.** Firstly, most of the deficit is due to non-inflationary military spending, meaning that fiscal consolidation should ultimately have little impact on GDP growth. Secondly, despite much higher net borrowing requirements in 2026 compared to 2025 (PLN 433 billion versus PLN 300 billion), treasury securities issuance will not increase. This is largely thanks to EU funds, which will be an important source of financing.

Consequently, we should not anticipate an increase in risk premiums on treasury securities. The fact that ASWs are currently wide, coupled with our view that the assumptions regarding real GDP growth (and, above all, the tax response to the GDP gap) are conservative, suggests room for upside surprises.

Status quo in the eurozone, the continuation of cuts in the US, and caution in China

Fed: Interest rates in the US have already fallen by 125 basis points from their peak. In our opinion, there is still scope for further reductions in borrowing costs, albeit on a smaller scale than the market currently anticipates. **We believe that the inflation problem has not yet been fully resolved, so the Fed will not be inclined to take more aggressive action.** At the same time, however, we are mindful of the inflationary risks posed by customs policy. Finally, it is difficult to imagine the Fed resorting to more aggressive cuts unless we see a decline in employment in the labor market. It should be noted that monetary policy will be less expansionary in the coming quarters, partly due to the conclusion of balance sheet reduction in December. **We expect the upper range for the federal funds rate to fall to 3.5%.**

ECB: In the first few months of the year, the monetary authorities completed the cycle of monetary policy easing, closing at 235 basis points for the key deposit rate. From around the middle of the year, the ECB's appetite for further rate cuts diminished considerably. Inflation is essentially no longer a problem, wage growth should slow down and economic activity should accelerate slightly. The macroeconomic outlook no longer signals a decline in inflation. Conversely, some within the ECB are suggesting that the next macroeconomic projections may show inflation to be too low. Nevertheless, we believe that economic developments will be robust enough to allay the concerns of some ECB members regarding low inflation. Consequently, we do not anticipate any interest rate changes next year. **Nevertheless, the risks are skewed to the downside.**

PBoC: Over the course of the year, the People's Bank of China only made a cosmetic cut to its main lending rates, despite having made much larger cuts in 2024. As might have been expected, this policy did not result in a revival of lending, as we wrote about a year ago. **Growth in household deposits signals a continuing strong desire to save**, with growth in term deposits and virtually no change in current deposits. Perhaps the Chinese authorities have realized that stagnation is not caused by the cost of money, but by low demand for credit resulting from continuing falls in property prices. **We think it is unlikely that the PBoC will decide to cut interest rates more aggressively next year.** However, we cannot rule out a slight adjustment that would be more indicative of a dovish stance by the central bank.



The natural interest rate in Poland: A useful tool or a waste of time?

The topic of terminal interest rate or so-called natural rate appeared at the NBP conferences. Estimates of the neutral rate are more like art than science. They rely on strong assumptions and a combination of unobservable variables. The margin for error is very large, as evidenced by the wide range of estimates. Additionally, in the case of Polish estimations, adding the inflation target to the estimated rate (creating the so-called i^*) leads to overshooting the actual level of interest rates. We replicated the Holston, Laubach, and Williams model from the Fed (HLW) and the Brand and Mazelis model from the ECB (BM). Currently, both models indicate that monetary policy is accommodative. The problem, however, is that these methodologies suggest such a state for more than 80% of the periods analyzed.

The artistic nature of neutral rate estimates results in a fact, that practically every economist can have their own favorite assumptions, method, or even point or range estimate. Unfortunately, although usually highly imprecise, the neutral rate is useful for market participants during a gradual monetary policy easing cycle (as is the case now), because the key is to determine the so-called terminal rate that will remain in place for 'some' longer time. **Glapiński, Governor of NBP, estimates this rate at around 1.5–2.0%, at least judging by his statements about the preferred nominal rate and inflation target. Other MPC members are slightly lower, in the 1–1.5% range.** The catch is that neutral rate estimates are (1) pro-cyclical, (2) dependent on current inflation (if inflation is lower than expected, the equilibrium rate will also decline), and (3) it is hard to find a historical example where a central bank ends up exactly where it initially aimed using this metric. For this reason, **we treat the neutral rate as a guideline, not a destiny. Ultimately, the inflation forecast is what matters.**

Should real interest rates remain high, as the NBP Governor currently communicates? In our view, this is a conservative approach – there are several arguments in favor of lower values. First, the potential pace of economic growth is declining – just 2–3 years ago, most organizations projected results exceeding 3% annually, whereas today, even in NBP reports, we are below that level by the end of 2027. This is happening, for example, due to an increasingly weak demographic situation. Second, the real interest rate is falling in the euro area and globally. Both the Fed and the ECB are easing or have already significantly eased their policies, while inflation remains within target ranges. Such environment helps Poland to afford lower rates without fear of excessive currency depreciation. Third, it is hard to find prudential arguments for cooling credit activity. The credit-to-GDP or credit-to-deposit ratio is very low.

Figure 1. Estimates of the NRI in Poland (main results, quarterly data, %)



Source: Authors' own elaboration.

Źródło: [Bielecki et al. (2024)]

Natural rate estimates (%)



Low inflation favors lower interest rates more than the market realizes

First, let us review the outcomes of the 2024 and 2025 scenarios. We relied solely on macro forecasts, disregarding all other considerations, including popular political arguments. The result? A 100% accurate forecast for 2024, and, if the Monetary Policy Council does not act in December, an error of only 25 basis points for 2025 (100% accuracy if it cuts). It appears that the market places too much importance on non-macroeconomic factors, and ultimately the MPC acts in accordance with macro conditions. It is worth noting that the NBP is among those central banks that react primarily to data rather than changes in forecasts. **We will not be changing our approach in 2026. Our forecast assumes a reduction in the reference rate to 3% by the end of the year, which is below both the market consensus (around 3.5%) and the Governor's current forward guidance (around 4%).**

The main argument behind this figure is low inflation, which we expect to remain below target for most of the year. Global inflation will continue to fall, although there is considerable room for progress in the area of services inflation. The lack of a clear decline in core inflation is due to changes in administered prices and internationally traded goods, which are beyond the control of the Monetary Policy Council. Nevertheless, with core inflation currently standing at 3%, its impact on CPI inflation is expected to be minimal.

Wage growth deserves separate consideration as it is usually mentioned by the Monetary Policy Council alongside inflation. This growth has consistently been lower than expected, surprising even NBP analysts. There are no particular reasons why this process should not continue in the coming quarters, with factors such as lower minimum wage growth, symbolic increases in the public sector and weakening appetite among companies for larger wage increases likely to persist. A temporary upturn in investment would not be enough to disrupt the downward trajectory.

Neither fiscal policy nor the exchange rate should present a challenge to the Monetary Policy Council. Recent months have clearly shown that relatively rapid disinflation is possible even with a deficit exceeding 6% of GDP. This demonstrates that the structure of the deficit is as important as its size. Regarding the exchange rate, we do not anticipate that the moderate zloty depreciation against the euro will influence MPC members' decisions (it is the USDPLN exchange rate, rather than the EURPLN exchange rate, that is key to filtering global disinflation).

Finally, the issue of ETS2 has been postponed until 2028. Therefore, none of next year's projections will factor this into their inflation paths.



Why not consider front-loading? An attentive reader — and we only have attentive readers — will notice that, despite the fact that inflation was very low at the beginning of the year, the Monetary Policy Council is not acting quickly. There are several reasons for this: 1) the upward trajectory of GDP growth, 2) a pause after earlier cuts, 3) a long period of accumulating evidence that the projection is overestimated and 4) the traditional lack of inflation data from the new year until mid-March.

Why is it still H2 if the cuts are resumed? There are four reasons for this: 1) The GDP forecast clearly shows a decline. 2) Inflation is still exactly on target or slightly below. 3) There is an accumulation of risks to GDP growth. If investments have not accelerated significantly so far, they are unlikely to do so now. This means that the demand gap will be much larger than we think. 4) Service inflation and wages are significantly lower.

Forecasts

		2023	2024	2025	2026	1Q25	2Q25	3Q25	4Q25	1Q26	2Q26	3Q26	4Q26
GDP	%, y/y	0.2	3.0	3.6	4.2	3.2	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.4	4.6	4.3	3.8
Domestic demand	%, y/y	-3.0	4.5	4.2	3.8	4.3	4.1	3.7	2.8	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.7
Investment	%, y/y	12.7	-0.9	3.6	9.3	6.4	-0.7	4.8	8.8	10.6	12.5	8.2	6.1
Private consumption	%, y/y	-0.3	2.9	3.9	3.6	2.6	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.2	3.7	3.5	3.1
Employment in National Economy (average)	%, y/y	0.3	-0.4	-0.2	0.0	-0.8	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.2
Wage growth in National Economy (average)	%, y/y	12.8	13.7	8.4	6.5	10.0	8.8	7.5	7.3	6.8	6.6	6.4	6.0
CPI (average)	%, y/y	11.6	3.7	3.6	2.3	4.9	4.1	2.9	2.6	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.3
CPI (end of year)	%, y/y	6.2	4.7	2.5	2.4	4.9	4.1	2.9	2.5	2.2	2.6	2.3	2.3
USD/PLN (end of perdiod)	PLN	3.94	4.13	3.63	3.61	3.87	3.60	3.64	3.63	3.58	3.57	3.61	3.61
EUR/PLN (end of period)	PLN	4.34	4.28	4.28	4.40	4.19	4.24	4.27	4.28	4.30	4.35	4.40	4.40
CHF/PLN (end of period)	PLN	4.68	4.55	4.60	4.68	4.38	4.54	4.57	4.60	4.61	4.65	4.69	4.68
SARON 3M (average)	%	1.65	1.01	0.02	-0.05	0.22	-0.04	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
SARON 6M (average)	%	1.52	1.52	0.78	-0.05	1.52	1.52	0.12	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
WIBOR 3M (average)	%	6.36	5.86	4.96	3.46	5.84	5.23	4.72	4.05	3.85	3.70	3.25	3.05
WIBOR 6M (average)	%	6.34	5.84	4.88	3.53	5.76	5.04	4.58	4.15	3.95	3.75	3.30	3.10
EURIBOR 3M (average)	%	3.62	3.40	2.07	1.95	2.34	1.94	2.03	1.95	1.95	1.95	1.95	1.95
EURIBOR 6M (average)	%	3.81	3.30	2.12	2.01	2.34	2.05	2.10	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01
SOFR 3M (average)	%	5.23	4.88	4.10	3.41	4.29	4.29	3.98	3.85	3.60	3.35	3.35	3.35
SOFR 6M (average)	%	5.23	4.74	3.99	3.33	4.19	4.15	3.85	3.77	3.52	3.27	3.27	3.27
NBP repo rate (end of period)	%	5.75	5.75	4.25	3.00	5.75	5.25	4.75	4.25	4.00	3.75	3.25	3.00
Unemployment rate (end of period)	%	5.1	5.1	5.8	5.5	5.3	5.2	5.6	5.8	5.9	5.7	5.4	5.5
GG fiscal balance	% GDP	-5.3	-6.6	-6.9	-6.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GG primary fiscal balance	% GDP	-3.2	-4.4	-4.4	-3.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GG debt	% GDP	49.5	55.1	60.6	66.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Current account	% GDP	1.5	0.3	-1.4	-1.0	-0.4	-0.7	-1.3	-1.4	-1.5	-1.3	-1.2	-1.0

Authors:

dr Marcin Mazurek
chief economist
marcin.mazurek@mbank.pl

Arkadiusz Balcerowski, CFA
economist
arkadiusz.balcerowski@mbank.pl

dr Jakub Rybacki
economist
jakub.rybacki@mbank.pl

Dawid Sułkowski
economist
dawid.sulkowski@mbank.pl

Visit our website makroekonomia.mbank.pl

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